浙江省人大常委会


浙江省外商投资企业工会条例
浙江省人大常委会


（1993年7月23日浙江省第八届人民代表大会常务委员会第五次会议通过 1993年7月25日公布施行）

目 录

第一章 总 则
第二章 外商投资企业工会组织
第三章 外商投资企业工会的权利
第四章 外商投资企业工会的义务
第五章 外商投资企业工会活动的保障
第六章 附 则

第一章 总 则
第一条 为了明确外商投资企业工会的法律地位，保障工会依法独立自主地行使权利和履行义务，维护职工和外商投资企业的合法权益，促进外商投资企业的发展，根据宪法和工会法、中外合资经营企业法、中外合作经营企业法、外资企业法等有关法律、法规的规定，结合本省实际，
制定本条例。
第二条 本条例适用于本省行政区域内的中外合资经营企业、中外合作经营企业和外资企业。
第三条 外商投资企业的职工有权依照工会法和中国工会章程的规定，参加和组织工会，依法开展工会活动。
第四条 外商投资企业工会是职工自愿结合的群众组织，是中国工会的基层组织，是本企业职工利益的代表。
第五条 外商投资企业工会具备民法通则规定的法人条件的，依法取得社会团体法人资格，工会主席为法定代表人。
第六条 外商投资企业工会应当尊重企业投资者的合法权益，支持企业搞好生产和经营管理。
第七条 外商投资企业应当尊重工会的合法权益，支持工会依法开展活动。

第二章 外商投资企业工会组织
第八条 外商投资企业应当建立工会。
外商投资企业开业、投产后未建立工会的，上级工会有权派员到该企业宣传工会法等法律、法规，指导职工组建工会。
第九条 外商投资企业建立工会组织应当经上一级工会批准。
第十条 外商投资企业工会会员人数在25人以上的，设立工会委员会；会员人数不足25人的，由会员选举产生组织员1人，组织工会会员开展活动。
工会委员会主席、副主席、委员由会员大会或会员代表大会民主选举产生。
外商投资企业女职工人数在25人以上的，可以设女职工委员会。
第十一条 外商投资企业职工人数较多的，企业工会经与企业协商，可以设专职工会工作人员。
第十二条 外商投资企业职工，承认中国工会章程，自愿申请加入工会的，经本企业工会或工会筹备组批准，可以成为工会会员。

第三章 外商投资企业工会的权利
第十三条 外商投资企业工会依法维护职工的民主权利和物质利益，保障职工的合法权益不受侵犯。
外商投资企业工会与企业应当建立协商制度，协调职工和企业关系，增进相互了解和合作。
第十四条 外商投资企业工会对企业执行国家和本省有关工资、福利、劳动管理、劳动保护、劳动保险、安全生产、女职工特殊权益保护等方面的法律、法规的情况进行监督。企业违反法律、法规，侵犯职工合法权益的，工会有权督促企业予以纠正，或要求有关主管部门予以处理。
第十五条 外商投资企业工会有权代表职工同本企业签订集体劳动合同，或指导帮助职工与企业签订个人劳动合同，并监督合同的履行。
第十六条 中外合资经营企业、中外合作经营企业研究决定企业的发展规划、生产经营活动等重大事项时，工会的代表有权列席会议，反映职工的意见和要求。
中外合资经营企业、中外合作经营企业研究决定有关工资、福利、职工奖惩、职工培训、安全生产、劳动保护和劳动保险等涉及职工切身利益的问题时，工会的代表有权列席会议，企业应当听取工会的意见，取得工会合作。
外资企业的工会有权对有关职工的工资、福利、安全生产、劳动保护和劳动保险等事项提出建议，同企业协商处理。
第十七条 外商投资企业工会对企业执行国家工时制度和休假制度的情况进行监督。企业确因生产需要加班的，职工的加班费按有关规定执行。职工因健康原因或其他正当理由不能加班的，企业不得强制。企业违反工时制度和休假制度的，或要求职工连续加班损害职工健康的，工会有
权提出意见，商定解决办法，或要求当地劳动部门予以处理。
第十八条 外商投资企业辞退、处分职工，在作出决定前，应当通知工会。工会认为不适当的，有权提出意见，企业应当充分听取和考虑工会的意见。
第十九条 外商投资企业工会依法督促企业加强劳动保护，保障职工在生产劳动中的安全和健康，并参与企业职工伤亡事故的调查处理。
第二十条 外商投资企业工会有权对企业用于职工福利的经费使用情况进行监督，并协助企业办好职工集体福利事业。


第四章 外商投资企业工会的义务
第二十一条 外商投资企业工会应当协助企业教育职工树立爱国主义思想，培养良好的职业道德，增强改革开放意识，遵守国家法律、法规和企业规章制度，履行劳动合同，努力完成企业的生产和工作任务。
第二十二条 外商投资企业工会应当支持企业搞好生产和经营管理，促进企业的发展。企业发生职工停工、怠工事件，工会应当会同企业或有关部门，协商解决职工提出的可以解决的合理的要求，协助企业恢复正常的生产秩序。
第二十三条 外商投资企业工会应当协助企业开展合理化建议和技术革新活动，组织职工参加培训，学习科学文化知识、先进技术和管理经验，提高职工的素质，促进企业提高经济效益。
第二十四条 外商投资企业工会应当组织中方职工和外方人员开展联谊活动，增进相互了解，合作共事。
第二十五条 外商投资企业工会应当组织职工开展有益于身心健康的文娱、体育活动，丰富职工的文化生活。

第五章 外商投资企业工会活动的保障
第二十六条 外商投资企业应当为工会的办公和活动提供必要的场所和设施。
第二十七条 外商投资企业应当按每月全部职工实际工资总额的2％向工会拨交工会经费。未按规定拨交或逾期拨交工会经费的，按国家有关规定执行。
外商投资企业工会经费的管理和使用，应当按照中华全国总工会和省总工会有关规定执行，并接受上级工会的指导和监督。
外商投资企业工会应当根据工会经费独立的原则，建立预算、决算和经费审查监督制度。
第二十八条 外商投资企业专职工会主席、副主席的工资和福利待遇，参照省总工会的规定，由企业工会和企业协商确定。
第二十九条 外商投资企业工会开展活动，一般不占用生产时间，需要占用生产时间的，应当事先取得企业方面同意。不脱离生产的工会主席、副主席、委员和组织员因工会工作需要占用生产时间的，应当事先征求企业的意见，企业应当支持，每人每月占用生产时间在两个工作日以内
的，其工资、奖金及各种补贴由企业照发。
第三十条 外商投资企业工会主席、副主席任期未满的，不得随意调动其工作岗位。确需调动的，应当征得本级工会委员会和上一级工会的同意。外商投资企业辞退担任工会主席、副主席职务的职工，应当征得上一级工会同意。
专职工会工作人员不再担任工会职务时，企业应当恢复其原工作或根据实际情况另行安排适当工作。

第六章 附 则
第三十一条 台湾、香港、澳门的公司、企业和其他经济组织或个人以及华侨在本省投资兴办的企业比照本条例执行。

第三十二条 本条例自公布之日起施行。



1993年7月25日


The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.